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The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing
Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through
Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws
Paul Weitzel

*

Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to compensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have
suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this Article takes a more
moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and bylaw provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an acquisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits while allowing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry
known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four standard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitration. Because enforcement would be customized on a company-by-company basis, shareholders could set a better balance between costs and benefits than the
ham-fisted, one-size-fits-all regime functioning today. This proposal requires no
legislative action; it requires only that the SEC bring its statutory interpretation in line with current Supreme Court precedent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Shareholder litigation is inefficient at compensating harmed
shareholders and deterring managerial misconduct. It is also plagued
by strike suits designed to force nuisance settlements. Several reforms have been offered, but these reforms are either rigid, which
harms both meritless and meritorious suits alike, or flexible, which
are often costly and subject to political pressures. Customized arbitration provisions improve upon these reforms by allowing enforcement to be tailored to each company's needs, granting some suits a
quick death in arbitration and others the full protections of litigation. The concerns about arbitration arise from two misconceptions.
First, shareholder litigation is not about management. Managers
and directors may have their names on the complaint, but at the end
of the day, the shareholders write the check, and the managers keep
their yachts. Studies show that shareholder litigation has little effect
on a manager or director's wallet or reputation. So when evaluating
remedies, the balance is not between the needs of shareholders and
management; it is about finding the right balance of benefits and
costs to shareholders in a suit against themselves.
Second, this is not about litigation. Nearly all shareholder suits
settle. These suits are about settlement, not judgment. So when evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of reform proposals, such as arbitration, we err by comparing them to litigation. With these perceptions corrected, most of the disadvantages of arbitration melt away.
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I propose allowing shareholders to decide what level of protection shareholder litigation should provide. I propose doing this by
allowing firms to include mandatory arbitration provisions in their
charters or bylaws. This does not require a change in the law; instead
it requires the SEC to reverse its position that arbitration violates
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, bringing the commission
back in line with current Supreme Court precedent.
Under my proposal, some firms may choose to retain the current
regime. Others might opt for binding arbitration of all claims. I suspect most would explore a mix of arbitration and litigation, customized to their needs. For example, acquisitive firms may push claims
regarding mergers into arbitration but allow more typical fraud
claims to continue through the courts. This proposal adds flexibility,
lowers the cost to taxpayers, and customizes solutions on a company-by-company basis. To invoke Smith, Wright, and Hintze's seminal theory, it leverages corporations as "laboratories of corporate
governance." 1
Further, because I do not propose imposing arbitration on any
company, but instead allowing each company the freedom to adopt
arbitration as it sees fit, it is not clear why we should care whether it
offers benefits to the company. Because managers are rationally apathetic to shareholder litigation, there is little reason to suspect they
will spend political capital pushing through arbitration against the
shareholders' will. And if it is the shareholders' will to limit their
own remedy, why should the government stop them?
Part II of this Article summarizes the current theory, criticisms,
and proposed reforms of shareholder litigation.
Part III sets out my proposal, which is to allow corporations to
creatively structure arbitration agreements to balance the benefits
and costs of enforcement.
Part IV addresses likely responses. This Part will show why an
arbitration provision would not violate securities laws, a claim the
SEC is likely to make. It will also show that, while legislators will
likely rail against arbitration, federal legislation is unlikely, and state
legislation is likely preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. The
plaintiffs' bar will likely sue to stop enforcement, but state contract
defenses to enforcement will likely fail.

1. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Share-

holder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L
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II. THE THEORY, CRITICISMS, AND PROPOSED REFORMS OF
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

A. Balancing Shareholder Costs
The debate over shareholder litigation has often been framed as a
struggle between shareholders and management. This makes sense.
The separation of capital from management creates misaligned incentives that often cause management to cheat. To prevent these
agency costs, shareholders incur monitoring and enforcement costs.
Because all of these costs are focused on keeping management in
line, a great deal of effort has gone into reaching the right balance
between shareholder protection, managerial innovation, and freedom
to operate.
This balance misses the larger point. The costs of managerial
misconduct are all borne by shareholders. They bear the cost of
fraud, of monitoring, of enforcing, and of missed opportunities
caused by overly restricting management. In addition, if the markets
lose their reputation for trustworthiness, shareholders pay the risk
premium associated with less trustworthy markets.
Because the costs of misconduct and the costs to prevent misconduct are all borne by shareholders, the goal should not be to balance management and shareholder interests but to balance shareholders' overall costs.
To discuss this balance, it is necessary to briefly consider the
costs shareholders face, in particular the cost of managerial fraud.

1. The direct costs offraud
Fraud has severe direct costs on shareholders. Although this is
noncontroversial, a few notable examples highlight the point.
When Enron, once the seventh largest corporation in America, 2
revealed its accounting fraud, its investors lost around $11 billion. 3
2. Fortune 500: 2001 Full List, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500_archive/full/2001 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
3. George j. Benston, The Quality of Corporate Financial Statements and Their Auditors Before
and After Enron, POLICY ANALYSIS, Nov. 6, 2003, at 12 available at http://www.cato.org/
pub _display.php?pub _id= 1356; see also David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.j. 61, 64 (2003). Others have estimated the losses at
around $29 billion. See Jonathan H. Gabriel, Note, Misdirected? Potential Issues with Reliance on Independent Directors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005).
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Less than a year later W orldcom revealed fraud that some estimate
cost its investors over $175 billion. 4 These frauds wiped out the retirement investments of thousands of employees, who also found
themselves out ofwork. 5
More recently, Bernie Madoff, former chairman of the NASDAQ
and Wall Street legend, 6 pled guilty to bilking investors out of
around $65 billion through a Ponzi scheme? In short, the direct
costs of fraud are high.
2. Collateral costs offraud

In addition to the direct costs, when fraud is revealed, share prices typically drop further than the cost of the fraud per share. 8 This
abnormal return may reflect damage to management's reputation,
uncertainty about the actual effect of the loss, or an expectation of
higher enforcement and monitoring costs to come.
A more diffuse cost is the effect of fraud on the perception of the
market as a whole. Trust in the market is a public good that can become subject to the tragedy of the commons. That is, fraud is costly,
so rational investors will require a higher premium to invest in markets that are perceived as more conducive to fraud. Businesses seeking to raise capital at the lowest possible cost have an interest in rigorously excluding those who harm the perception of a fair market.
Every fraud hurts everyone.

4. Daniel Kadlec, WorldCon, TIME, july 8, 2002, at 28, available at http://www.time.com/
time/classroom/glenfall2002/pdfs/Business.pdf.
5. See id.; see also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2942 (20 10) (Sotomayor,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

L

6. Monica Gagnier, The Rise and Fall of Bernard L. Madoff BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec.
12,
2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blogs/recession _in_ america/ archives/
2008/12/the_rise_ and_fa.html.
7. Madoff Gets
150 Years for
Fraud,
CBC
NEWS
Qun.
29,
2009),
www.cbc.ca/news/business/ story/2009/06/29/madoff-ponzi-fraud-sentence564.html. This figure likely overstates investor losses because the nature of the Ponzi scheme required Mad off to
pay some returns to investors. The net loss figure is estimated at around $18 billion. See The
Madoff
Scam:
Meet
the
Liquidator,
CBS
NEWS
Qun.
20,
2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/20 10/06/19/60minutes/main 6598786.shtml.
8. See]. DAVID CUMMINS, CHRISTOPHER M. LEWIS & RAN WEI, THE MARKET VALUE IMPACT
OF OPERATIONAL RISK EVENTS FOR U.S. BANKS AND INSURERS 34-35 (Dec. 23, 2004). available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=640061; jASON PERRY & PATRICK DE FONTNOUVELLE, MEASURING
REPUTATIONAL RISK: THE MARKET REACTION TO OPERATIONAL Loss ANNOUNCEMENTS 1-3 (Oct.
30, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=861364;
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3. Costs of preventing fraud
Investors also face the costs of preventing fraud, which include
monitoring and enforcement costs. These costs usually increase in response to increased direct costs as litigation creates new enforcement
costs and political pressure creates new monitoring requirements.
For example, after the accounting scandals that rocked Enron
and WorldCom, and to a lesser extent Halliburton, Qwest, Tyco,
AIG, and Parmalat, 9 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which requires new internal control procedures designed to
expose and prevent fraud. 10 The compliance cost of these new procedures in 2007 was around $1.7 million per company, 11 more than
eighteen times the SEC's original cost estimate. 12
Likewise, enforcement costs can quickly get out of hand. Cleaning up the Madoff fraud, which had a net cost to direct investors of
about $18 billion, 13 will likely cost more than $1.1 billion for attorneys, accountants, and consultants. 14
This paper focuses on enforcement costs, specifically shareholder
litigation. Enforcement serves as a deterrent to prevent fraud, but
over-enforcement or inefficient enforcement can create more costs
than benefits. Shareholders may find that arbitration reduces their
enforcement costs more than it increases agency and monitoring

9. Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, Il6 PENN. ST. L. REV.
437, 457 (20Il).
10. See I5 U.S.C. § 7262 (20I2).
II. FE! Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance Cost $1.7 Million, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 30, 2008), http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=204. This is
down from $2.92 million in 2006. See SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, N.Y. TIMES (May
23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /05/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-regs.4.5843 7
OO.html.
I2. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. I643,
1645-46 (2007) (noting also that first-year implementation costs were eighty times greater than
the SEC had estimated for companies with market capitalizations over $700 million).
13. See The MadoffScam: Meet The Liquidator, supra note 7.
14. David S. Hilzenrath, After Madoff Fees for Lawyers, Others Untangling Mess Expected to Top
$1 Billion, WASH. PosT (Mar. 31, 20ll), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
inspector-general-finds-sec-practices-might-compromise-fraud-probes/2011/03/31/
AFYKgVAC_story.html?hpid=z3; see also Linda Sandler, Lehman, Madoff Lawyer Fees May Deplete
Investor Fund, SEC's Watchdog Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 31, 20ll),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/high-lehman-madoff-lawyer-fees-may-depletesi pc-sec-watchdog-report -says. html.
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costs, in which case it would be a net gain for shareholders. I begin
with a more detailed review of shareholder litigation.
B. Shareholder Litigation Theory
This section discusses the sources, purposes, problems, and proposed reforms of shareholder litigation.
1. Sources of shareholder litigation
There are three major sources of shareholder litigation. The most
criticized is derivative litigation, which allows a shareholder to sue
on behalf of the company. These suits are usually brought against
the officers and directors of a corporation for breach of a fiduciary
duty. 15
A second common source of shareholder litigation is shareholder
securities fraud class action suits. Professors Baker and Griffith
found that ninety-three percent of securities class actions brought in
2005 alleged fraud, specifically violations of Rule 1Ob-5 under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). 16 Rule
lOb-S of the Exchange Act prohibits fraud and misstatements in the
sale of a security. 17 These claims are brought directly under the federal securities laws and are removable to federal court. 18
A third common type of shareholder litigation is class actions
challenging director action in an acquisition. Thompson and Thomas

15. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (2004).
16. Tom Baker & Sean]. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 498 (2007).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The statute states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
18. 15 u.s.c. § 77p (2012).
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found that this type of litigation makes up around eighty percent of all
breach of fiduciary duty claims in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 19
2. Purpose and problems of shareholder litigation

Shareholder litigation is meant to allow shareholders to check
the agency cost of managers and directors. In that sense shareholder
litigation is designed to be compensatory-it puts cash back into the
pockets of wronged shareholders-and a deterrent-it punishes
managers for their bad acts, which incentivizes them to behave well.

a. Compensation theory, pocket-shifting, and well-diversified investors.
The compensation justification is widely rejected by scholars. 20
Because settlements to shareholders are paid from the company's
treasury, which already belongs to the shareholders, the payments
are mere pocket-shifting. 21 This means shareholder settlements are
little more than a court-enforced dividend with heavy transaction
costs. 22 Even settlements paid by insurers or consultants are paid by
the shareholders through higher fees. 23 Put simply, shareholders
cannot come out ahead by suing themselves.
Diversification creates a more subtle problem. The bad acts that
form the basis of these suits create winners and losers among shareholders. For example, those who hold shares when a manager tells a
pleasant lie benefit from the lie. Those who hold shares when the lie

19. Thompson & Thomas, supra note IS, at 137.
20. See, e.g .. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545-47 (2006); janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. Rt:v. 1487, l503 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. Rr.v. 611, 641-42
(1985); Donald C. Langcvoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
639, 648-50 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 20, at 1503; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at
641-42 (pointing out that a diversified investor is as likely to bencl!t from fraud as to be harmed
by it, so payments from current to past shareholders are inefficient in the face of monitoring and
enforcement costs).
22. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 20, at 1545-47.
23. Suits against consultants are uncommon. In 2011, auditors were named in only 3% of
securities class actions, and underwriters were named in only 10%. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW 27 (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/UlLmml; see also Langevoort, supra note 20, at 648-50 (arguing persuasively that
securities litigation settlements are funded in three ways: (I) from the company, (2) from an
insurer, or (3) from a service provider, such as an accounting firm). Transfers from the company
are "pocket-shifting," and transfers from insurers or service providers are reflected in higher
premiums and fees. Id.
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is revealed are harmed by the lie. For shareholders that buy and hold
the company's shares through both of these events, the direct benefits and costs of the lie balance each other out. But while the fraud is
ongoing, active shareholders may sell (thereby benefiting) or buy
(thereby being harmed). A well-diversified investor is as likely to
benefit from the fraud as to be harmed by it, so, in the end, welldiversified investors net to zero. So well-diversified investors, ex
ante, should show as little concern to the direct costs of the fraud as
to the direct benefits because they are equally likely to face either. 24
Of course, opportunism will spur concern when applied to a specific
situation. But shareholder litigation doesn't cure these harms; it
merely complicates the accounting by repaying shareholders harmed
by the fraud with money taken from current shareholders, who may
not have benefited from the fraud. In the end, the current shareholders must repay not only the benefits taken by those who sold earlier
but also the litigation costs associated with making those payments.
Because shareholders are paying their own recoveries, and because well-diversified investors net to zero, compensating shareholders cannot justify shareholder litigation.
Professor Daniel Morrissey argues that this reasoning applies only to well-diversified investors, so a simple shareholder with an unvaried portfolio may still benefit from shareholder litigation. 25 This
assumes simple shareholders trade as actively as more sophisticated
investors. Shareholder settlements are paid only to those that bought
or sold during the period tainted by fraud. 26 If simple investors are
more likely to adopt a buy-and-hold strategy, 27 they are less likely to
be part of any settlements, so there will be no litigation gains to offset litigation losses. Shareholder litigation is likely more costly to
simple investors with unvaried portfolios, not less.

24. By no means do I mean to discount the indirect costs of fraud discussed elsewhere in
this Part, but indirect costs do not justify shareholder litigation under the compensation theory.

25. Daniel]. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114 W.VA. L. REV. 531,
556 (2012).
26. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
27. Professor Zhang finds that about 78% of trading volume is conducted by highfrequency traders, which make up 1·-2% of all trading firms. X. FRANK ZHANG, HIGH-FREQUENCY
TRADING, STOCK VOLATILITY, AND PRICE DISCOVERY 16 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 1691679. This suggests it is unlikely that simple investors make up much of the remaining volume.
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b. Deterrence. Shareholder litigation's second justification is
deterrence. The deterrence theory says that managers will be less
likely to misbehave if they will be punished for it. In effect,
shareholder litigation supplements pre-fraud monitoring. The theory
fails because shareholder litigation rarely punishes managers.
Ninety-six percent of shareholder securities class actions settle
within common insurance limits, leaving insurers to fully fund the
settlement. 28 Even when insurers do not cover the entire settlement,
individual defendants rarely make up the difference with personal
funds. 29
An argument could be made that shareholder litigation has reputational costs, but this is unlikely because litigation is ubiquitous.
Over a five-year period, the average public company has a ten percent chance of facing a class action securities suit. 30 Transactionoriented firms face even worse odds. Approximately ninety-four percent of mergers now lead to shareholder suits. 31 If everyone is being
sued, being sued no longer signals incompetence.
Professor Eric Helland's always insightful work bears this out. 32
His review of director elections after a shareholder class action found
that directors suffered a loss of reputation only in shareholder suits
that resulted in settlement values in the top quartile or where the
SEC was involved. 33 SEC involvement signals possible criminal activity, and high settlement values may signal incompetent negotiating.
Because there is no out-of-pocket cost or reputational cost to
most shareholder suits, they are an ineffective deterrent.

c. Other justifications: corporate governance and informed trading.
Professor

Lawrence

E.

Mitchell

offers

a

clever,

alternative

28. See james D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
512 (1997); see also janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 46-47 (1993).
29. See Alexander, supra note 20, at 1498-99.
30. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 20, at 1547-48.
31. MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, TAKEOVER LITIGATION IN 2011, at 2 (2012),
available at http:!/ssrn.com/abstract= 1998482.
32. Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49
J.L. & EcoN. 365, 366 (2006).
33. ld.; see also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 j.L.
ECON. & ORe.. 55,84 (1991) (finding slight increase in turnover ofCEOs at firms subject to suit,
but overall finding "little evidence of specific deterrence" for management).
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justification for securities litigation: punishing shareholders. 34
Mitchell argues that shareholders have a "responsibility to protect
the integrity of our financial markets through their voting and
trading." 35 Failing in this duty leads to fraud, which leads to the
pains of shareholder litigation, which may prod otherwise free-riding
shareholders to monitor management more closely. In effect, he fixes
the deterrence problem not by changing who is punished but by
redefining who deserves punishment.
This argument has a few weaknesses. First, state law places
sharp limits on shareholders' ability to control management. 36 Increasing the incentive to act cannot overcome the inability to act.
Second, it is unclear what the punishment should urge the shareholders to do. Collective action necessary to modify controls on
management can be extremely costly, often involving a proxy contest.37 In contrast, the cost of shareholder litigation, on a per share
basis, is still just a gadfly. The costs of shareholder litigation will
rarely be sufficient to incentivize a rational investor to run a proxy
contest rather than sell his shares. Finally, shareholder litigation no
longer signals that management has misbehaved. As discussed
above, shareholder litigation has become so ubiquitous that even a
shareholder that is willing to act would not see the shareholder suit
as a signal that action is needed.
Empirical evidence also challenges this theory. Professor Talley
found that very few corporate governance practices were statistically
significant in predicting the targets of shareholder litigation. 38 Share
price, volatility, and volume were far better predictors. 39 If corporate
governance is not a good predictor of litigation, then a properly mo-

34. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence
in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 291-92 (2009).
35. Id. at 292.
36. See ]ill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 333, 340-41 (2009) (discussing legal limitations on shareholders' ability to prevent
management from acting badly).
37. See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42222-01, 42230-31,
42231 n.l14 (Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (providing data from a proxy
service that estimated the average cost of a paper proxy at $5.64 per shareholder and notice of an
internet proxy at $2.36 per shareholder, assuming 19% still request paper copies).
38. Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
335,350-52,363-66 (2009).
39. Id. at 349-50.
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tivated shareholder would not attempt to reduce shareholder litigation by focusing on corporate governance.
Professor Jill Fisch offers an alternative justification, arguing that
securities litigation promotes informed trading. She argues that securities fraud disproportionately harms informed investors, who actively trade on information, including false information. 40 Research
done by these investors becomes incorporated into share prices, and
accurate share prices are a public good. In this sense, informed trading creates an externality. However, informed traders are less likely
to be diversified, she argues, because of the high research costs associated with investing in an additional company. 41 Because they are
less diversified, and because they actively trade on information, they
are more likely to be net losers from fraud. On the other hand, because they trade more frequently than buy-and-hold investors, and
trade based on new information, they are more likely to be part of
the class in securities litigation, making them net winners in litigation. She argues that securities litigation compensates informed
traders for the externalities they provide by offsetting their greaterthan-average losses from fraud. 42
One problem with this argument is that a trade requires activity
from two parties: a buyer and a seller. So if a trade occurs during
the period affected by fraud, the fraud creates one winner and one
loser. If the buyer and seller are both informed traders, then informed traders as a whole have not been made worse off. If both
are uninformed traders, then there is no net effect on informed
traders. So the theory works only when a trade occurs between an
informed trader and an uninformed trader, and then only if they are
on the right side. Though certainly possible, it seems unlikely that
these trades could make up enough volume for this theory to find
support. 43

40. Fisch, supra note 36, at 346-48.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Professor Zhang has found that about seventy-eight percent of trading volume is by
high-frequency traders and that these trades hinder price discovery rather than improve it. X.
FRANK ZHANG, supra note 27, at 13-16, 26. This raises questions of how often uninformed traders trade with informed traders and the value added by these traders. Without more clearly defined terms, it is difficult to say whether these high-frequency traders are informed or not.
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d. Costs. In addition to offering very little bang, shareholder
litigation costs a lot of buck. These suits are expensive, so as a
compensatory device, they are grossly inefficient. A survey of
settlements from 2002 found that the avera~e securities class action
settled for 2.9% of its estimated damages. 4 From these recoveries,
plaintiffs' attorneys take 25-35%. 45 The payout to small investors
after these fees is often so low that they do not even bother to collect
it.46
A full accounting of costs must also include defense costs, which
the shareholders must pay, and which likely match the plaintiff-side
costs, 47 and the costs of distracting managers from their duties. As
CEO salaries rise, so does the cost of wasting their time.
These suits create public costs as well. On an unconsolidated basis, securities class actions made up 48% of all class actions that
were pending in federal court between 2004 and 2005. 48
Finally, these suits cost the U.S. markets their competitiveness. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation found that
foreign issuers commonly cite the enforcement system as the
most important reason for not listing in U.S. markets. 49 The increased cost of the U.S. enforcement system is reflected in insurance rates. Fortune 500 companies listed in the U.S. typically carry twice as much D&O insurance as those listed in Europe and
pay triple the rate per dollar of coverage. 50 These increased costs
harm the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets, which has
declined in nearly every measure over the last few years. 5 1

44. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2002: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 5 (2003), available at http://securiries.stanford.edu/clearinghouse _research/2002 _ YIR/
2002_yir_settlements. pdf.
45. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT Of' THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 79 (2006).
46. Miles Weiss, Carlyle Curbing Shareholder Rights Irritates Lawmakers Who See Precedent,
BLOOMBERG Oan. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-26/cariyle-lawsuit-bandeplored-by-lawmakers-may-entice-followers.html (paraphrasing Professor Hal Scott).
47. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 45.
48. ld. at 74. This figure likely overstates the total burden because discovery is often consolidated, and only 8% of these cases proceed to a ruling on summary judgment. See
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 18.
49. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 45, at 71.
50. Id. at 78.
51. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION Or- THE U.S. PUBLIC
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e. Unintended consequences. Shareholder litigation also creates other
unfortunate consequences. Ironically, shareholder litigation can
actually make it more difficult to detect and punish managerial
fraud. The typical shareholder suit runs something like this. After
the announcement of a merger or a major decline in the stock price,
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys file suit and attempt to force a
quick settlement. Their ability to quickly stake a claim and then
settle has led many in the industry to label them "pilgrims." 52
The problem is that managers have learned to play along. They
realize that large transactions will inevitably lead to shareholder
suits 53 and that settling with pilgrims can create a bar against later,
possibly meritorious, suits. 54 By settling quickly with the pilgrims,
management avoids the costs of discovery, substantive negotiation,
and the risks of actual litigation. 55 This wide release from future
claims eliminates the primary goals of shareholder suits: to detect,
deter, and punish managerial misconduct.
A second unintended consequence flows from these settlements.
In 2005, shareholders sued in 38.7% of large acquisitions. 56 By 2011
that number had climbed to 94.2%. 57 Because litigation is expected,
a rational dealmaker will account for it as a transaction cost during
negotiations. 58 This operates as a tax on every transaction, which,
like most taxes, creates a deadweight loss. Because rational dealmakers expect this cost, there are mutually beneficial deals on the margin that are never done, creating efficiency losses to no one's gain.

EQUITY MARKET 5 (2007) (showing a decline in U.S. competitiveness across a number of
measures, including number of U.S. initial public offerings listed only abroad and foreign delisting on the New York Stock Exchange).
52. See In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010).
53. Cain and Davidoff found that 94.2% of mergers resulted in shareholder litigation in
20ll~up from 38.7% in 2005. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31.
54. See Rev/on, 990 A.2d at 952, 956, 59-60.
55. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs' counsel never even bothered to put on a facade of
discovery).
56. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31.
57. ld.
58. See Romano, supra note 33, at 62-63.
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3. Past proposals for reform

For years, shareholders, legislators, and academics have proposed reforms. Reform proposals come in two types: rigid reforms
that affect all suits and flexible reforms that rely on gatekeeper discretion.
Among the rigid reforms are those that heighten pleading requirements,59 expand safe harbors, 60 limit who can sue, 61 cap damage amounts, 62 or delay discovery. 63 These reforms have the advantage of being easy to administer and remaining uninfluenced by
discretionary politics or prejudice. They tend to keep the playing
field level while moving back the goal posts.
The downside is that they are blunt instruments which cannot
actively balance over-enforcement with under-enforcement. The filters restrict the meritorious and frivolous alike.
This has led some scholars to call for a regulatory gatekeeper,
which would prescreen suits to determine whether to allow them to
proceed. Professor Amanda Rose argues that the SEC could fulfill
this role. 64 Professor A.C. Pritchard goes a step further, arguing for
the elimination of private enforcement of some types of shareholder
suits and instead authorizing the securities exchanges to be the sole
enforcers. 65
The gatekeeper approach has many advantages. It preserves the
benefits of discretionary non-enforcement, limits over-enforcement,
and avoids the under-enforcement caused by more rigid reforms.
However, it has two large drawbacks. First, the gatekeeper's incentives may not align with the shareholders'. Gatekeepers are subject to regulatory capture and political pressure, which could cause
under-enforcement in industries that capture the gatekeeper and
over-enforcement in industries that are politically unpopular.

59. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737, 747(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000)).
60. Id. at 749-51.
61. Id. at 740 (preventing a person from being a lead plaintiff more than five times in
three years).
62. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 648-50.
63. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of1995, 109 Stat. at 737.
64. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule JOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2008).
65. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 983 (1999).
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Second, gatekeepers are expensive. Prescreening every suit
would entail huge costs that would require increased taxes or fees. 66
If the regulator were the sole enforcer, these costs would be even
higher.
III. THE REMEDY: FREEDOM TO ARBITRATE

I propose allowing shareholders and management to set the balance between over- and under-enforcement by adopting arbitration
provisions in their bylaws or charter.
A. Allowing Arbitration

What follows is the affirmative argument explaining how these
provisions might work and some examples of the many variations
creative shareholders might develop to suit their needs. I address the
legal arguments against enforcement in Part IV below.

1. Why an arbitration provision will likely be enforceable
An arbitration provision is enforceable whether analyzed under
the Federal Arbitration Act or Delaware law.
The Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of all agreements to arbitrate. 67 A corporation's bylaws and charter form a
binding agreement between the corporation and its shareholders and
directors. 68 So if either the bylaws or charter require arbitration of
shareholder disputes, it is an agreement to arbitrate that must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Looking at it another way, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently suggested that corporations may include forum selection
clauses in their charter to avoid litigating shareholder disputes in forums other than the Court of Chancery. 69 An arbitration clause is
nothing more than a "specialized kind of forum-selection
clause." 70 So if a corporation can amend its charter to select the

66. It may be possible to bill the plaintiffs for this screening under the assumption that if
the claim is not worth the screening fee, it should not be brought.
67. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (2012).
68. See Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995).
69. See ln re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
70. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989)
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,519 (1974)).
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Court of Chancery as the forum, it can likewise select arbitration as
the forum.
2. Setting loose the "laboratories of corporate governance"

71

The exact language of the provision could be as unique as the
company chooses. It might apply arbitration to all claims or only to
certain categories of claims, such as those involving mergers or those
valued above a certain amount. Arbitration could be the initial forum, or apply only when a party requests arbitration or after the
complaint survives a motion to dismiss. 72
One variation that might create a good balance would be to begin
the case in arbitration but allow shareholders to remove the case to
federal court with the written consent of some percentage of the
outstanding shares. This would ensure a low-cost death for frivolous
claims but allow the full protections of federal court when shareholders agree the suit is worthwhile.
A variation on that alternative would be to expand or contract
the scope of judicial review of the arbitral award. 73 The provision
could provide for complete de novo review by the courts or de novo
review of law, with limited review of facts.
Firms with complex arbitration provisions may allow an arbitrator to determine if a dispute is subject to arbitration-a practice approved by the Supreme Court. 74
These are just a few examples of what corporations may discover.
Allowing the freedom to adopt a provision that is right for them leverages the full creativity of these "laboratories of corporate governance."75

71. Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 1, at 181.
72. See Bradley j. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform
of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to I.itigation, 33 HARV. ].L. &
PUB. POL'Y 607, 635 (2010).
73. See jENNIFER j. jOHNSON & EDWARD BRUNET, ARBITRATION OF SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS:
WHY
CHANGE
IS
NOT
ALWAYS
A
MEASURE
OF
PROGRESS
28, available at
http://SSRN.com/abstract= 1112826.
74. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (implying that in
some circumstances the parties likely considered the scope of arbitration when drafting the contraer).
75. Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 1, at 181.
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B. Pros and Cons of Arbitration

There are many benefits to arbitration.
[I]t is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler
procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility
and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings
among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling
of times and places of hearings and discovery devices. 76

At the outset, it is worth noting that my proposal is not that every corporation should adopt an arbitration provision or that one arbitration provision would work best for all corporations. Because I
propose allowing each corporation to choose for itself the extent that
it uses arbitration, if at all, the counterarguments carry the day only
by showing (1) that arbitration is always worse for every corporation
in every form or (2) that corporations will systematically adopt arbitration provisions that are worse than the current enforcement regime. This is a high bar, which I do not see met.

1. Costs
The most cited benefit of arbitration is the cost savings. I break
down this analysis by considering procedural costs, liability costs,
and spillover costs? 7 It is worth mentioning that even if the average
firm would pay more under arbitration, this is no reason to prohibit
it. Not every firm is the average firm, so some may find it costeffective. And if the firm chooses to take upon itself higher costs, it's
not clear why the government should prohibit if from doing so.

a. Procedural costs. Procedural costs are the costs of reaching a
disposition. Scholars generally agree that arbitration is less
expensive than litigation because, as Professor David Schwartz
explains, arbitration "offers less room for complexity." 78

76. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) ). But see Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 585-94 (2007)
(arguing that arbitration has none of these advantages).
77. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1266 67 (2009) (dividing up arbitration costs by liability and procedural costs).
78. Td. at 1268.
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Arbitration cuts costs by cutting options. It offers limited discovery and motions practice. Discovery costs alone typically average
about 50% of total litigation costs. 79
It is not clear how much of these cost savings will apply in
shareholder disputes. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA), discovery does not begin until after the court rules on
any motion to dismiss. 80 About 16% of cases settle before this, and
another 9% are voluntarily dismissed, meaning 25% never reach discovery anyway. 81 Nearly 90% of the remaining cases are either dismissed or settled after surviving a motion to dismiss, with only 8%
of all filings reaching a ruling on summary judgment. 82 While it is
unclear how much discovery occurs between a rejected motion to
dismiss and an eventual settlement, 83 discovery seems to be the exception, rather than the rule.
Discovery in significant securities class actions is typically conducted through an e-discovery database, which costs one to three
million dollars to set up. 84 Defendants obviously want to settle
quickly and avoid these costs, but because the costs will be covered
by insurance, which also pays for the plaintiffs' recovery, the plaintiffs also have an incentive to reduce costs. 85 With these aligned incentives, one would expect that few litigants would commence such
costly discovery, but an illuminating survey by Professors Baker and
Griffith found that the parties "emphasized" that they must "prepare
for trial, if only to have a credible threat." 86
Because discovery costs can be astronomical and because the parties insist on incurring them, it seems that any cost benefit gained
from early dismissals is overwhelmed by enormous discovery costs.

79. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547-48 (1998).
80. IS U.S.C. § 77z-l (b) (I) (2012) (applying discovery stay to litigation under the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (2012) (applying discovery stay to litigation under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
81. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 18.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010).
84. Tom Baker & Sean]. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 777 n.93 (2009).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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This suggests that arbitration likely offers substantial net savings in
procedural costs.
Going further, firms may decide to leverage the benefits of both
systems, adopting an arbitration provision that kicks in only if the
case survives a motion to dismiss. 87 This avoids the high cost of discovery without giving up the benefits of quick dismissals. 88
b. Liability costs. Arbitration likely reduces liability costs as well.
Jury verdicts in shareholder litigation suits are exceptionally rare. 89
One commentator has noted that since the PSLRA was passed in
1995, only seven securities class actions have reached a jury
verdict. 90 Because settlement is the near-certain outcome, liability
costs are best calculated as settlement costs.
Arbitration would likely reduce settlement costs significantly. By
reducing the procedural costs of discovery, the alternative to settlement is not as ruinous, which reduces the plaintiffs' power to extort
large settlement values.
Arbitration will also encourage early settlement because consistent outcomes are easier to predict; predictable outcomes mean
the parties will have settlement valuations of the case, which increases the chance of an early settlement.
There are a few reasons to think that arbitration would not reduce
settlement values. First, the largest cost of shareholder litigation is often the decline in share price. 91 For external shocks, share prices drop
on a one-to-one ratio with the announced loss, but for announcements
of internal fraud, the ratio is much higher. 92 Even without the pressure
of high procedural and liability costs, a corporation may settle high to

87. See Bondi, supra note 72, at 635.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 633 ("[L]ess than two percent of civil claims filed in court are decided by a
judge or jury.").
90. Adam Savett, Only 7th Post-PSLRA jury Verdict Is In, ISS GOvERNANCE (May 7, 2009,
http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2009/05/only-7th-post-pslra-jury-verdict-is6:04
PM),
in.html; See also Peter Lattman, A Rare Species: The Securities-Fraud Class-Action Trial, WALL ST. ].L.
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007, 3:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/10/24/a-rare-species-thesecurities-fraud-class-action-trial.
91. See CUMMINS, LEWIS & WEI, supra note 8, at 34--35.
92. PERRY & DE FONTNOUVELLE, supra note 8, at 2-3.
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quickly regain its losses in share price. This is unlikely. Empirically, although stocks decline with the announcement of a suit, there is no statistically significant bounce back when the suit is terminated. 93
Second, corporations may not push for lower settlement values
because they have no skin in the game. Because D&O insurance typically covers the entire settlement, corporations may face little incentive to reduce the total settlement amount. This is unlikely because
D&O insurers may raise premiums in response to high settlements.94
Third, because arbitration settlements are more likely to be confidential, 95 a corporation may settle higher because there is less
precedential value in a high settlement. However, this is unlikely because if the settlement value is material it would likely need to be
reported on Form 8-K or the company's annual report. 96
Fourth, some commentators believe that arbitrators are more
likely to adopt a split-the-baby approach to awards, giving more
money to plaintiffs' counsel than the suit is otherwise worth. However, the current regime is one of settlement, not judgment. Settlement is a split-the-baby approach because plaintiffs' counsel has no
incentive to settle without some payment.
c. Feedback between liability costs and procedural costs. One might
argue that because liability costs concern only the amount of money
transferred from one pocket to the other, we should not care
whether they are high or low but should focus on efficiency and
procedural costs. This argument has some merit, but attorney fees
are often calculated as a percentage of the settlement value, 97 so
higher settlements lead to higher attorney fees.

93. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 282-83 (1985-1986).
94. Romano, supra note 33, at 57.
95. See, e.g., The Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933 (Form S-1), at 288 Qan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1527166/000095012312000638/w83442a2sv1za.htm (proposing an arbitration provision with a
confidentiality clause).
96. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CURRENT REPORT: PURSUANT TO SECTION l3 OR 15(D) OF
THESECURITIESEXCHANGEACTOF 1934 (Form 8-K) Item 1.01.
97. These fees typically run 25-35% of the total recovery. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, supra note 45.

86

The End of Shareholder Litigation?

65

In addition, high recoveries encourage more strike suits. If arbitration reduces recoveries, bounty-hunting plaintiff attorneys would
have less incentive to file strike suits. If defendants do not face the
risk of mega-awards or the high procedural costs of litigation, there
is less incentive to settle high on a bogus claim. The plaintiffs' bar
will realize the reduced value of strike suits and will be less likely to
file them.

d. Spillover costs. Arbitration would also reduce spillover costs to
society and firms that are not being sued. With lower procedural and
liability costs, D&O insurance rates will likely decline for all firms. 98
And the public will benefit from moving the cases out of congested,
publicly funded courts into privately funded arbitration.
2. Speed

A second advantage of arbitration is that it would likely be faster
than the current regime. Currently, the average federal securities
class action takes over four years to settle. 99
Studies of bilateral arbitration have found it is two to three times
faster than similar litigation. 10 Class actions are more complex, but
studies still show that they "take considerably less time than incourt proceedings in which class certification is sought." 101 If the
advantages of bilateral arbitration applied at the same ratio, it could
shave an average of thirty-one months off the time it takes to settle a

°

98. 0&0 insurance rates in the U.S. are currently about six times higher than in Europe
per dollar of coverage, which experts attribute to higher enforcement costs in the U.S. Td. at 71.
99. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2011), available at http://securities. stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW _199 5-201 0/Settlements _Through_l2 _201 O.pdf. The average
case in federal court takes 11.7 months from filing to a final disposition. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS
15-16
(20 11),
available
at
http://www. uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/20 10/J udicialBusiness20 10. pdf.
100. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL.]. 44, 51 (2003-2004) (finding that arbitration reaches a
disposition 3.02 times faster than state litigation and 2.78 times faster than federal litigation in
employment disputes).
101. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer,]., dissenting). But see id. at 1751 (majority opinion) (criticizing the slow speed of class action arbitration
compared to bilateral arbitration).
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shareholder suit. 102 Even a fraction of this benefit would be a welcome reform.
3. Expertise

Arbitration would likely improve the quality of the disposition
because arbitrators would have more experience in securities disputes than federal judges. In securities class actions between 1996
and 2011, 160 judges ruled on summary judgment motions. 103 For
133 of those judges (83%) it was the first time ever handling summary judgment in a securities class action. 104 Only eight judges had
ruled on three securities class action summary judgment motions in
their entire career, and no judge had ruled on more than three. 105
If firms increasingly opt-in to arbitration, it is likely that a relatively small number of arbitrators would handle most of the cases.
The parties would benefit from increased expertise, which would
lead to more thoughtful rulings and decrease the costs of educating
the adjudicator.
A third benefit of expertise is consistency. With fewer decision
makers, the results would be more consistent, suffering less from
the natural variations that occur when there are a large number of
decision makers. This added consistency would increase fairness by
ensuring that similar companies are treated similarly for similar acts.
It would also increase the predictability of the outcome. Because
most judges have ruled on only a handful of these cases in their careers, it is difficult for litigants to predict how the judge might view
the case. The judge's view of the case directly determines settlement
values, and if the value is more difficult to determine, the parties are

102. I reach this figure by assuming the average securities class action takes 4.1 years to
reach a disposition. See RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 99. I calculate the total time in arbitration
by dividing 4.1 by 2.78. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 100.
103. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 20 fig.18. This figure is limited to summary judgment motions, though the broader point holds true for initial filings. In total 843
judges presided over filed securities class actions. Of those, 582 judges (69%) had worked on
three or less, and only 65 judges (8%) had worked on ten or more. Id. at 19 fig.17.
104. Id. at 20 fig.18.
105. Id.
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more likely to have different views of what the case is worth. Arbitrators specializing in shareholder litigation would have a track record that would allow better outcome prediction, leading to better
case valuations and increasing the chance of settlement.

4. Customization improves the overall balance
The current private enforcement framework is an attempt to balance the costs and benefits of shareholder litigation. Theoretically,
this framework could be optimized by increasing the level of enforcement until the marginal costs of enforcement equal its marginal
benefits for the average firm. The problem is that very few firms are
the average firm.
For example, 94.2% of mergers now lead to litigation. 106 So
shareholders in a firm that is actively engaged in mergers and acquisitions face a higher than average litigation cost. Unless there is
some reason to expect higher than average benefits from this type of
litigation, the balance is way off. My proposal would allow shareholders at merger-oriented firms to limit merger-related suits to arbitration while allowing other suits to reach the courts. This would
correct the balance on a company-by-company basis.
Likewise, studies show that share price and volatility are better
predictors of litigation risk than corporate governance measures. 107
A firm in a volatile industry could require a larger drop in shareholder price before the claim would be allowed out of arbitration.
This principle applies equally well to any characteristic that leads
to a disproportionate amount of litigation. The corporation's shareholders could isolate the characteristic and reduce the litigation to a
proper balance.
Enforcement customization is already well established in other
areas of securities law. For example, well-known seasoned issuers
are subject to looser enforcement when filing shelf registration
statements. 108 Allowing customization of shareholder litigation is a
continuation of this philosophy.

I 06. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31.
107. Talley, supra note 38, at 349-52, 363-66.
108. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(d) (2007); id. § 230.415.
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5. Advantages over other reform proposals

This proposal has several advantages over prior reform proposals. It improves the current system by weeding out bad suits
quickly and cost-effectively. It is an improvement upon rigid reforms
because it is customized on a company-by-company basis to set a
better balance between over- and under-enforcement. It is also superior to the more flexible reforms, such as those employing gatekeepers. There is virtually no threat of capture or political distortions,
and because the shareholders serve as their own gatekeepers, the
system would not require public funds; on the contrary, the public
would save money by shifting from publicly funded courts into private arbitration.
6. Director overreaching, deterrence, and compensation
We may be concerned that the corporations will set the wrong
balance, pushing everything into arbitration and thereby eliminating
any deterrence or compensatory effect those suits now have. In other
words, we may be worry that management may grant itself a license
to commit fraud.
This concern is not troubling for two reasons. First, as explained
above, shareholder litigation has few benefits now, so there is not
much deterrent or compensatory benefit to lose. 109
Second, there is no reason to think shareholders or management
would set such an extreme balance. If shareholders set the balance, it
is not clear why we should second-guess their decision to limit their
own remedy. And it is unlikely that management would implement
overly broad arbitration provisions because, frankly, they have no
dog in that fight.
Shareholder litigation is not a fight between management and
shareholders; damages are paid by the shareholders or the insurance
company, not by management. Whether the suit is litigated or arbitrated, whether it succeeds or fails, managers still get to keep their
yachts. 110 Because management is rationally apathetic to shareholder
litigation, it is not clear why we should expect them to spend politi-

1 09. See supra Part ll. R.2.
110. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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cal capital to push an unpopular arbitration provision. 1 1 1 In short,
managers will not try to throw off the constraints of shareholder litigation because shareholder litigation imposes no constraints.
Pfizer Inc. and Gannett Co., Inc. have recently provided wonderful evidence of rational managerial apathy to shareholder suits. Donald and Susan Vuchetich owned stock in both Pfizer and Gannett and
sought to include in the companies' proxy materials an arbitration
provision requiring arbitration of direct and derivative claims. 112 The
companies sought to exclude the provision, which the SEC allowed,
finding that "there [was] some basis for [the] view that implementation of the proposal would cause the company to violate the federal
securities laws." 113 The companies also argued that because the provision was untested, it was likely to lead to litigation.
Pfizer's and Gannett's management showed that they would rather be subject to shareholder litigation than litigate whether the arbitration provision was enforceable. This suggests managerial ambivalence to shareholder litigation and undercuts arguments that
managers will overreach with arbitration provisions.
7. Corporate favoritism

The most common complaint against arbitration is that it favors
corporations over consumers. The argument is that the corporation
is a repeat player, so the arbitrator, recognizing who butters his
bread, unfairly tips the scales against consumers. 114
There are several problems with this argument as applied to
shareholder litigation. First, several studies show just the opposite.
Consumers win more frequently in arbitration than in litigation, pay
fewer fees, and wait less time for a resolution. 1 15

1 11. Five companies just proved this point, dropping from their bylaws an unpopular provision that would have required all shareholder suits to be brought in Delaware. See Brian JM
Quinn, Firms Surrender on Exclusive Forum Bylaw, M & A L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2012), http:/I
Iawprofe ssors. type pad. com/ m ergers/2 0 12/0 3I firm s-s urrend er -on-exclusive-forum-bylaw.h tml.
112. Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012); Pfizer
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012).
113. Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012); Pfizer
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012).
114. See Sarah H. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration:
What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1053, 1053 n.l4 (listing common complaints
about arbitration).
115. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme
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Second, the shareholders are more likely to benefit from any repeat player favoritism. In 2011, 86.2% of class action fraud complaints were filed against a corporation that had not been subject to a
suit yet that year. 116 Between 1997 and 2010 this figure was slightly
higher at 89.1%. 117 Very few corporations face more than one class
action fraud complaint per year. In any given year, only about 2-3%
of all listed companies face any class action litigation at all. 118 Combining these figures, less than one percent of listed companies are
repeat players, facing two or more suits in a year.
On the other side, plaintiffs' counsel is much more likely to be a
repeat player. One law firm, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, was
lead counsel in 52% of federal securities class actions in 2009 and
33% in 2011. 119 In 2009 the top seven firms served as lead counsel
in 85% of cases, and in 2010, 91% of cases were led by one of only
nine firms. 120
These results are a bit startling. While less than one percent of
listed companies will face even two of these cases a year, 91% of
plaintiffs' attorneys will come from just nine firms. 121 Plaintiffs'
counsel will be the repeat player, so any arbitrator looking to please
his benefactor will favor plaintiffs, not management.
8. Protecting shareholders' day in court
A common complaint about arbitration is that it deprives the litigant of the dignity of having her day in court. This concern is not
troubling because "most publicly available information is reflected in
[the] market price [of a share]." 122 Once an arbitration provision is
adopted, the market price will reflect the arbitration requirement, so
new purchasers will receive an appropriate price discount (or pay a
premium) reflecting the value of the arbitration provision. In other

Court's Recent Arbitration jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REV. 457, 472 (2011) (collecting studies).
116. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 8.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 9.
119. Id.at21.
120. Id.
121. These numbers will likely adjust as shareholder arbitration provisions become more
common, but there is no reason to suspect that shareholders bringing a suit will turn to a wider
range of counselors than now.
122. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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words, the shareholder sold the value she places on the dignity of going to court by purchasing at a lower share price.
Investors who purchased before an arbitration provision was
adopted either (1) had a chance to vote on the provision, (2) granted
the board power to unilaterally amend the bylaws, or (3) purchased
shares at a price that reflected the board's power to unilaterally
adopt bylaws. So if the stock trades in an efficient market, the shareholder has already been compensated for the cost of the chance of an
arbitration provision through the share price. 123
As former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said, "If somebody tells
you that you're going to have a very different set of remedies if you
make this investment, and you still want to invest, it seems to me
government has done its job." 124

9. Atrophy of the law
One serious concern of allowing arbitration is the atrophy of
corporate law. 125 Written opinions are a public good because they
provide guidance to third parties. Arbitration decisions are nonprecedential, and arbitrators usually are not required to write detailed
opinions. If arbitration becomes widespread, it could slow the development of the law because fewer written opinions will be issued.
This concern will likely have a smaller effect in shareholder litigation than it does in other areas of the law for three reasons. First,
unlike other disputes, shareholder litigation is already under the eye
of several watchdogs-the SEC, the exchanges, and FINRA to name
a few. Any of these groups could require that arbitrators issue written opinions or could study the arbitration process and require adjustments. The law would continue to develop because these regulators maintain their mandate to protect investors and, like the
companies themselves, have an incentive to improve the efficiency of
the capital markets.

123. See Kidsco 1nc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[W]here a corporation's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no vested rights
can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.").
124. Gordon Smith, Carlyle Abandons Arbitration Provision, THE CONGLOMERATE (Feb. 3,
2012, 10:26 PM), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/02/carlyle-abandons-arbitrationprovision-.html (quoting former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt).
125. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 4.
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Second, this concern is likely overstated. Adoption of arbitration
provisions will not be universal, as explained above in the section
discussing director overreaching. 126
Finally, it is unlikely that this atrophy will be worse than the current state of the law in terms of quantity and quality. Litigation creates very few precedential decisions and does so inefficiently. In
2011, the Delaware Court of Chancery produced only 23 opinions. 127
The inefficiency is more difficult to see. One hundred eighty-eight
federal securities class actions were filed in 2011. 128 Between 1996
and 2011, 60% of federal securities class actions were voluntarily
dismissed or settled, meaning no appeal was filed so no precedential
decision was possible. 129 Of the remaining 40%, it is likely that only
a fraction were appealed, and of those that were appealed, an even
smaller fraction would garner a full opinion rather than a memorandum disposition that offers little guidance to future parties. 130 It
takes hundreds of suits to create relatively few precedential decisions; because of this, it is difficult to argue that litigation is a costeffective way to create any public benefits. 131
Along with the low quantity, the quality of these decisions is
questionable. Judges typically have very little experience handling securities class actions. A study of the careers of judges presiding over
federal securities class actions in 2011 revealed that not one judge
had previously ruled on more than three class action summary
judgment motions. 132 The diverse field of newcomer adjudicators
likely decreases the quality of new opinions. 133 Certainly Delaware

126. See supra Part Ill.B.6.
127. Court of Chancery Opinions and Orders, DELAWARE STATE COURTS (2011),
http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/list.aspx?ag=court +of+chancery (sort by description).
There were also 82 memorandum opinions, 17 master's final reports, 73 letter opinions, and two
letter decisions. Id.
128. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 1.
129. Id. at 18.
130. In 2011, 85% of decisions from the federal courts of appeals were unpublished. THE
STATISTICS DIVISION, jUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR
38
tbl.S-3,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness201l.pdf.
131. Romano, supra note 33, at 85; see also Jeffrey A. Sanborn, Note, The Rise of'' Shareholder
Derivative Arbitration" in Public Corporations: In Re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337, 339 (1996).
132. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 19-20.
133. Id.
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provides expert judges, but plaintiffs' counsel is increasingly looking
to file "anywhere but Delaware." 134

10. Lacks transparency
A related concern is that arbitration lacks transparency. Transparency is beneficial because it guides future litigants and lawmakers, and it allows reputational damage to the bad actors, which might
increase the deterrent effect. 135 Arbitration typically lacks transparency because arbitrators are not required to issue lengthy opinions
for their rulings, making their reasoning difficult to evaluate.
The lack of transparency in arbitration is not a virtue, but it is
not a concern either, because it is no worse than the current situation. As stated earlier, these actions almost universally settle. 136 To
criticize arbitration for a lack of transparency, we must compare it to
the transparency of settlements.
Like decisions in arbitration, settlements often provide only an
outcome. Some arbitration provisions, like that recently proposed by
Carlyle Group, 137 include confidentiality clauses, but any material
settlement would need to be reported under the Exchange Act. 138 In
both arbitration and settlement, shareholders see only the outcome
without any justification. Shareholders are not entitled to review settlement negotiations, board minutes, or internal evaluations. In
short, the high settlement rate in securities litigation cuts the legs
out from under any argument opposing arbitration based on transparency.

134. See Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the "Anywhere But Chancery" Problem Into the "Nowhere
But Chancery" Solution, 14 STAN. ].L. Bus. & FIN. 199, 200 (2008). See generally Ted Mirvis, Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (2007),
available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Mirvis _-_ %20anywhere_but_chancery.PDF. The Southern District of New York also has several judges with expertise in securities regulation, which
plaintiffs' counsel has the same motivation to avoid.
135. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 30.
136. One commentator has noted that since the PSLRA was passed in 1996, only seven
securities class actions have reached a jury verdict. See Savett, supra note 90.
137. The Carlyle Grp. L.P., supra note 95.
138. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CURRENT REPORT: PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(0)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Form 8-K) Item 1.01.
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11. Arbitration may not be a good fit for high-stakes disputes
Because arbitrators are less confined by legal rules, and there are
fewer options to overturn an erroneous decision, some have speculated that arbitration is poorly suited for high-stakes disputes. 139
This argument is belied by the large number of high-stakes disputes
recently submitted to arbitration. Johnson & Johnson and Merck &
Co. recently paid $500 million to settle a suit in arbitration. 14 Chevron's dispute over Venezuela's nationalization program recently led
to a $250 million settlement. 141 A quick Google search of "arbitration million" reveals hundreds of multi-million dollar arbitration
disputes.
Even if high-stakes arbitration is risky, it is not clear why it
should be outlawed. The typical approach, reflected in the business
judgment rule, is to allow companies the freedom to take risks.

°

C. Implementation

A corporation can form an agreement to arbitrate shareholder
disputes by adopting a binding arbitration provision in its charter or
bylaws. While either is likely to be upheld, a charter amendment
may offer more protection.

1. Charters and bylaws bind shareholders
Delaware treats a corporation's charter and bylaws as contracts
that bind shareholders, even if unilaterally adopted by the directors.142
For example, in Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, the Delaware Court of
Chancery upheld a bylaw amendment that was unilaterally adopted
by the directors to delay a hostile acquisition. 143 The hostile bidder

139. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); see also jOHNSON &
BRUNET, supra note 73, at 23-24.
140. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1790 (Breyer, ]., dissenting) (citing Peter Loftus, Rivals Resolve
Dispute Over Drug, WALL ST.]. (Apr. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBJOOO 142405274
8704495004576264691589085236.html).
141. Charlie Devereux & Nathan Crooks, Venezuela Pays Exxon $250 Million to Settle Arbitration Case, BLOOMllERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-02-17/venezuela-pays-exxon-250-million-to-settle-arbitration-case .html.
142. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483,490 (Del. Ch. 1995).
143. ld. at 492.
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had issued a press release, stating that it had begun soliciting shareholders to call a special meeting to remove the target's board. 144 Later that day, the directors of the target corporation met, largely by telephone, and after fifteen minutes of deliberations, amended the
bylaws to prevent a shareholder meeting from being held within sixty days of the date it was requested. 145 This would delay the hostile
bidder's attempts to replace the board.
Shareholders supporting the hostile bidder sued, arguing that
they had a vested right to an earlier meeting because they had already begun soliciting proxies. 146 They argued that they should not
be bound by the board's unilateral amendment because the process
for calling a meeting was already in progress. 147
Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs rejected these arguments because
"although the by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its
stockholders, the contract was subject to the board's power to
amend the by-laws unilaterally." 148 The shareholders were bound by
the unilateral amendment, and the meeting was delayed. 149
Delaware is not breaking new ground with this holding. Every
state to address the issue has held that bylaws and charters are contracts binding upon shareholders. Appendix A provides citations for
forty-three states that have addressed the issue, each finding that the
bylaws and charter bind shareholders. These holdings go back as far
as 1844. 150
The major treatises are also unanimous. The Corpus juris Secundum, 151 the American jurisprudence (Second Edition), 152 and the Fletch-

144. Id. at 489.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 490.
147. Id.
148. I d. at 492 (internal citations omitted).
149. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) ("It is
settled law that certificates of incorporation are contracts."); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 2008) (holding that bylaws are a contract).
150. Susquehanna Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 7 Watts & Serg. 348, 1844 WL 5011, at *2 (Pa.
1844).
151. 18 C.j.S. Corporations§ 170 (2011) ("Generally, actions may be brought upon by-laws
operating as contracts between a corporation and its members or third persons, by the parties
thereto.").
152. 18 AM.)UR. 2d Corporations§ 14 (2011).
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er Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations 153 all treat bylaws and charters
as an agreement binding upon shareholders.
This result makes sense. A corporation's charter contains the
rights and limitations on the stock, including mandatory dividends,
liquidation preferences, and participation rights. 154 These protections would be meaningless if charter provisions could not be enforced against the corporation or against fellow shareholders.
Likewise, bylaw provisions can regulate such things as when a
special meeting of shareholders may be called. 155 If these were not
enforceable against shareholders, they would also be meaningless.
2. Whether to use a charter or bylaw
For Delaware 156 corporations, an arbitration agreement is more
likely to be upheld if it is included in the charter rather than the bylaws. Delaware requires a shareholder vote to amend the charter. 157
In contrast, bylaws may be amended by the directors without a
shareholder vote if the charter allows it, so the case for enforcing an
arbitration bylaw against shareholders is weaker. However, courts
are likely to uphold even a unilaterally adopted bylaw. 158

a. Charter. A charter provision is the most natural place for an
arbitration provision. A corporation's charter may contain "any
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of
the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders." 159 This broad
language would permit an arbitration clause to be included in the
charter.
A recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery supports this
conclusion. The court suggested that companies use a charter

153. 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 4198 (rev. vol. 2012).

154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § l02(a)(4) (1998).
155. See Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995).
156. I focus on Delaware law because about 60% of public companies are incorporated
there. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 ].L. & EcoN.
383, 391, 395 (2003); see also Lewis, supra note 134.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a), (a)(3), (b) (1998).
158. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 492.
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(l) (1998).
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amendment for forum selection clauses. 160 Although the court did
not refer directly to arbitration, arbitration agreements are typically
analyzed as forum selection clauses, 161 so the provision would likely
be upheld under Delaware law.

b. Bylaws. An arbitration provision could also be included in the
corporation's bylaws, 162 but there are several reasons this is riskier
than including it in the charter.
First, Delaware requires that the "rights" and "limitations" on
shares be listed in the charter. 163 If an arbitration provision creates a
right or limitation on the shares, it would need to be included in the
charter. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that arbitration affects the substantive rights of the parties, so a litigant would probably be unable to argue that an arbitration provision affects the rights
or limitations on the shares. 164
Second, if the bylaw is enacted by the directors without the vote
of shareholders, it weakens the argument that the shareholders consented to arbitration. Economically, this shouldn't matter. Once the
bylaw amendment is adopted, the market price will reflect the arbitration requirement, so new purchasers will have received a commensurate price discount (or paid a premium). 165 Those who held
the stock before the bylaw was adopted either approved the charter
160. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("[I]fboards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.").
161. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83
(1989) ("[A ]rbitration agreements . . . are 'in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause."') (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) ("[A]n agreement to
arbitrate before a specified tribunal [is], in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.")
(quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519).
162. In Delaware, bylaws can address any issue "relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees," as long as the provision does not contradict the charter or
violate the law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1998).
163. Td. § 102(a)(4).
164. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (" [R]esort to the arbitration process does not
inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities
Act.") (emphasis added).
165. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
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provision that gave the board power to unilaterally amend the bylaws
or they purchased the stock at a price that reflected this power. 166 So
if the stock trades in an efficient market, lack of shareholder rarticipation probably won't defeat an arbitration bylaw provision. 1 7 Still,
one court has found shareholder approval to be relevant in an analogous context. 168
Third, if the bylaw is adopted unilaterally by the shareholders, it
may violate Section 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which prohibits shareholder bylaws that substantively limit the
board's managerial authority. 169 Because arbitration is procedural, 170
not substantive, 171 this argument likely fails.
Practically speaking, if the shareholders are intent on an arbitration provision, it seems unlikely that management, which is rationally apathetic to shareholder litigation, 172 would object. The better
practice is to include the provision in the charter and avoid the fight.
Fourth, a shareholder-adopted arbitration bylaw would be void if
it prohibited directors from exercising their fiduciary duties. 173 This
probably is not a problem. A reviewing court evaluates the bylaw as
applied to the facts of the case, presumes the bylaw is valid, and if
possible, construes it so that it does not violate the law. 174 So a challenger would have to show that arbitration of the current dispute violates the directors' fiduciary duties. Given the benefits of arbitration, this is unlikely to succeed.

166. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 212.
167. See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[W]here a corporation's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no vested rights
can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.").
168. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("Certainly were a
majority of shareholders to approve such a[n] . . . amendment [limiting the forum to Delaware], the arguments for treating the venue provision like those in commercial contracts would
be much stronger, even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against
the amendment.").
169. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234, 234 n.l I (Del. 2008).
170. !d. at 235.
171. A bylaw is procedural if it "establishes or regulates a process for substantive director
decision-making." Id. It is substantive if it "mandates the decision itself." Id. Arbitration does
not determine liability; it defines only the process used to establish liability, so it is likely procedural.
172. See supra text accompanying note 97.
173. CA. Inc., 953 A.2d at 238.
174. Id.
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IV. LIKELY RESPONSES

Arbitration of shareholder disputes is likely to cause some energetic responses from regulators, legislators, and the plaintiffs' bar.
A. SEC Approval and the Legality of Arbitration Under the Securities Laws
Because arbitration provisions seem most likely to first appear in
the charters of companies preparing for an initial public offering,
which must be approved by the SEC, I begin with an analysis of
whether the SEC would approve an arbitration provision. In 1990,
the SEC rejected a registration statement of a company whose charter included an arbitration provision. More recently, while this paper
was in draft, the SEC nixed an arbitration provision in the charter of
Carlyle Group before allowing the S-1 to become effective. 175
The SEC's opposition stems from Section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act. Section 29(a) makes void any waiver of compliance with the Exchange Act. 176 This chapter includes the statutes regulating federal
securities class actions, 177 so waiver of the right to class action litigation is seen as a waiver of compliance with the chapter.
The SEC's argument relies on the premise that arbitrating claims
under the Exchange Act is a waiver of compliance with the Exchange
Act. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this position in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon. 178
1. Shear son/American Express Inc. v. McMahon

In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, two investors sued
their broker for, among other things, violating the Exchange Act's
anti-fraud provisions-section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. 179 These are

175. An SEC spokesman said, "We advised [Carlyle] that the staff was not prepared to
clear the filing with the mandatory-arbitration provision included." Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle
Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition Mounts, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban.html.
176. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
178. 482 u.s. 220, 227-28 (1987).
179. !d. at 223.
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the same sections that form the basis of most securities class actions.180
The broker invoked the mandatory arbitration clause in the brokerage agreement. 181 The district court ordered arbitration on the
Exchange Act claims, 182 and the circuit court reversed. 183 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Exchange Act
claims were arbitrable. 184
The question was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"FAA") applied to Exchange Act claims. 185 The FAA makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."186
The Court held that the FAA presumptively allows arbitration of
statutory rights, so arbitration agreements are enforceable unless the
challengers show "Congress intended to make an exception to the
[Federal] Arbitration Act for claims arising under . . . the Exchange Act, an intention discernible from the text, history, or purposes of the statute." 187
Turning to the statutory text, the Court first considered whether
Section 29 (a) created an exception to the FAA. 188 Section 29 (a)
would be triggered only if the arbitration provision waived compliance with the Exchange Act, so the question was whether the arbitration provision waived compliance with any part of the Exchange
Act.
The investors pointed out that Section 27 of the Exchange Act
grants exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims to the district
courts. 189 They argued that because the arbitration provision grants

180. Baker and Griffith found that ninety-three percent of securities class actions brought
in 2005 alleged fraud, specifically violations of Rule lOb-S under the Exchange Act of 1934.
Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 498 .
181. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
182. Id. at 224.
183. Id. at 224-25.
184. Id. at 242.
185. Id. at 226-27.
186. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (2012).
187. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
188. Id. at 227.
189. Id. Section 27 of the Exchange Act states thP following:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of viola-
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jurisdiction to arbitrators rather than district courts, it violates Section 27, making the arbitration provision void under Section 29 (a).
The Court disagreed. It held that Section 29 (a) prohibits waiver
only of the "substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange
Act." 190 Because the jurisdictional statute did not create a substantive obligation, the arbitration provision did not waive a substantive
obligation, and Section 29 was never triggered. "[W]here arbitration
does provide an adequate means of enforcing the provisions of the
Exchange Act,§ 29(a) does not void a predispute waiver of§ 27." 191
Next, the investors argued that the arbitration provision waived
compliance with the substantive protections of the Exchange Act. 192
The Court rejected this broader argument, holding that "[b ]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 193 That is, because the
arbitration provision was merely a change in forum, it did not affect
substantive rights, so there was no waiver of compliance, and Section 29 (a) was not triggered.
Next the Court addressed the suitability of arbitration for Exchange Act claims, addressing the investors' argument that arbitration weakened their protections. 194 The Court pointed out that the
SEC approved the arbitration procedures that were adopted by the
exchanges and invoked by the broker agreement. 195 It held that
"where, as in this case, the prescribed procedures are subject to the
[SEC's] authority [over self-regulatory organizations], an arbitration
agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the [Extions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder.
. . Any suit or action to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any
violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district
or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
190. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
191. Jd. at 229.
192. Id.
193. Jd. at 229-30.
194. Id. at 231-34.
195. Id. at 234.
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change] Act." 196 This point was reemphasized in the conclusion:
"[W]here the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that
arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforcement does not effect a waiver . . . under§ 29(a)." 197
Having rejected each of the investors' arguments, the Supreme
Court held that claims under the Exchange Act were subject to predispute arbitration agreements. 198
2. SEC approved procedures

Applying McMahon's holdings to arbitration of shareholder disputes, only one of the investors' arguments creates some pause. The
Court ruled that an arbitration provision did not necessarily violate
the substantive protections of the Exchange Act because the arbitration procedures were subject to SEC review. 199 This implies that a
firm hoping to adopt an arbitration provision increases its chances of
a favorable ruling by deferring to procedures that the SEC has adopted.
Finding such a regime may be tricky. The majority of securities
fraud arbitration claims are filed with FINRA, 200 and FINRA's arbitration provisions specifically prohibit class-wide arbitration, requiring that each claimant's case be arbitrated separately, a process
known as bilateral arbitration. 201 The NYSE, 202 NYSE Arca, 203 and
NYSE Amex 204 each defer to FINRA's rules, and the NASDAQ205

196. Jd.
197. Id. at 238.
198. Id.
199. Jd.
200. Arbitration Procedures, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/arbproc.htm (last modified Feb. 07, 2011).
201. FJNRA Rules 12204(a), 13204(a), FINRA MANUAL, http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid =2403&element_id=607 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
202. Arbitration Rules, Rule 600A, NYSE RULES, http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools
/bookmark.asp?id=sx-policymanual-nyseArbitrationRulesR600A639&manual=/nyse/rules/
nyse-rules/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
203. Rule 12 Arbitration, NYSE ARCA RULES, http://usequities.nyx.com/arca-regulation/
rules-interpretations/area-rules (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
204. Arbitration Rules, Rule 600, NYSE MKT RULES, http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/
PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp _1_ 4&manual=/AMEX/rules/amex-rules/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2012).
205. Equity Rules, Rule 3110(/)(6), NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, http://nasdaq.cch
wallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/Platform Viewer.asp?selectednode =chp _1_1_ 3_2&manual = %2F
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and Chicago Stock Exchange206 require that arbitration agreements
exclude class actions. In short, the SEC has not approved procedures
for class-wide arbitration. 207
Some clarification by the SEC would be helpful, but an exact
match may not be necessary. Later in the McMahon opinion, the
Court reaffirmed that "potential complexity should not suffice to
ward off arbitration." 208 If the procedures are already calibrated to be
fair to the parties, expanding the arbitration to a class action is just
an increase in complexity, which may be insufficient to defeat arbitration. 209
Later rulings by the Court suggest that the SEC's approval of the
arbitration process is not necessary. Two years after McMahon held
that Exchange Act claims are arbitral, the Court held that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitral in Rodriguez De Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express Inc., overruling an earlier decision. 210
In doing so it never discussed whether the arbitration procedures
were subject to the SEC's regulatory authority. 2 ll Instead, the Court
treated the arbitration agreement as a forum selection clause, 212
holding that " [t] here is nothing in the record before us, nor in the
facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral
system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is
entitled." 213

nasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F (last visited Oct. 3 I, 2012).
206. Article
14,
Rule
2,
Section
l (c),
CHI.
STOCK
EXCHANGE,
http://www.chx.com/content/Participanr_lnformation/Downloadahk_ Docs/Rules/Rules_CHX_
07302012.pdf (lase updated July 30, 2012).
207. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, .52,660 (Oct. 28, 1992).
208. Shear son/ Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987) (quoting
lv1itsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 ( 1985)).
209. Rut see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011) (highlighting the differences between bilateral and class arbitration).
210. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 47'7 (1989).
211. They were though. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F .2d
1296, 1297 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The agreement relied on NASD's arbitration rules. NASD is now FINRA, so it relied on the rules used for the majority of securities
claims.
212. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
213. Id. at 483 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953)(Frankfurter,]., dissenting)).
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Addressing investor protection a second time, the Court again
declined to address SEC oversight and instead looked to the FAA's
saving clause, which nullifies arbitration agreements obtained "from
the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract."' 214
In its conclusion, the Court reiterated a third time that "resort to
the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the
substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act,"
again endorsing arbitration generally without regard to whether the
SEC approved the procedures. 215 While the Court specifically referred to SEC approved procedures, it seems likely that if a corporation adopts the arbitration provisions of any generally accepted program, those procedures would be upheld.
A narrower reading-one that would permit only those procedures approved by the SEC-would lead to a perverse result. The
SEC has not approved any procedures allowing for classwide arbitration; however, FINRA's rules permit bilateral arbitration. The SEC
has regulatory authority over FINRA's arbitration procedures, so an
arbitration agreement invoking them would likely be affirmed under
McMahon. So if SEC-approved procedures are required, a company
would be free to adopt bilateral arbitration, relying on FINRA's
rules, but would be prohibited from adopting classwide arbitration,
which has not been SEC approved. 216 This result is absurd because
bilateral arbitration is effectively a one-man securities suit, so the
costs will easily outweigh the benefits. So in an attempt to preserve
shareholder litigation from arbitration, such a ruling would eliminate
shareholder litigation altogether.
In the end, SEC approval may be a matter of politics more than
statutory interpretation. After the SEC shot down Carlyle's arbitration provision, Harvey Pitt, the SEC Chairman under President

214. Id. at 483-84 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473

u.s. 614, 627 (1985)).
215. Jd. at 485-86.
216. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court recently held that contracts may require
bilateral--rather than class-wide-arbitration even for claims that could legally be litigated as a
class. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
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George W. Bush, said "[i]t would have passed on my commission."217 A company looking to include a shareholder arbitration
provision may just need to wait for a new chairman.
B. Legislative Response and the Limits on State Power

If the SEC permits arbitration, there is likely to be some legislative backlash. Professors Johnson and Brunet have set out a wonderful list of bills and letters from congressmen seeking to limit arbitration.218 Populist and judicial outrage at arbitration is why the FAA
was passed to begin with. 219
When Carlyle's arbitration provision hit the press, several congressmen openly opposed allowing arbitration of shareholder disputes. Senator Blumenthal said the provision would "eviscerate
shareholder rights." 220 Representative Ackerman spoke less strongly
but agreed it would cause shareholders to forfeit their rights, adding,
"It should not be allowed to happen." 221
Because the FAA is the basis for most arbitration enforcement,
legislative attempts to stop arbitration of shareholder disputes would
likely be effective only on the federal level. The reform would likely
be controversial, making it unlikely to succeed in a divided Congress.
State legislatures, which face less publicity, may have the political leeway to pass legislation, but any state legislation would likely
be ineffective. My proposal would insert the arbitration provision into a corporation's charter or bylaws, which are governed by state law.
Contract law applies to the interpretation of charters and bylaws,
which is also state law. But these state law issues are constrained by
the FAA and the internal affairs doctrine.

217. Weiss, supra note 175.
218. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 10. I highly recommend this piece for those
studying arbitration of shareholder litigation. The paper is filled with insightful nuggets of wisdom.
219. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270, 280 (1982) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982)); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of the Leland Stanford
junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
220. Weiss, supra note 46.

221.

!d.
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1. The Federal Arbitration Act's limits on state laws
Under the FAA, states retain power to apply traditional contract
defenses. 222 "Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin,
is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concernin~ the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." 23
However, any law attempting to make an arbitration provision in
a charter unenforceable would have to be "generally applicable." 224 It
could not "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate" as
the basis for finding a contract unenforceable. 225 This prohibits laws
that discriminate against arbitration directly or that "disproportionate [ly] impact" arbitration. 226 It is difficult to imagine that any state
law limiting arbitration of shareholder disputes could avoid these
pitfalls.
Also, the state law cannot target charters and bylaws specifically.
Circuit courts have expanded the "generally applicable" requirement
to strike down state laws that apply unique rules to certain types of
contracts, such as franchise contracts, when those laws are applied to
contracts containing an arbitration provision? 27 They have reasoned

222. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Section 2 states the following:
A wntten provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
I d.

223. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
224. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
225. rd. at 1747 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9).
226. ld. at 1747 (criticizing procedures that apply to both arbitration and litigation yet
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements).
227. See: Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); KKW Enters.,
Inc. v. Gloria jean's Gourmet Coffee Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 51 (lst Cir. 1999) (holding
that the FAA preempts a Rhode Island statute prohibiting franchise agreements from selecting
forums outside Rhode Island because the statute is not generally applicable; it is applicable only
to franchise agreements); Doctor's Assocs. v. Hamilton, ISO F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (same
for New jersey law); Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. I 997)
(doubting that the FAA would allow a state law requiring in-state arbitration); Mitchell v. Am.
Fair Credit Ass'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202-03 (Ct. App. 2002) (collecting circuit cases).
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that because the statute does not apply to every contract, it is not
generally applicable. 228
Furthermore, state law cannot invalidate the agreement through
clever interpretations. A court may not "in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement
in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes
nonarbitration agreements under state law." 229 The same principles
of contract interpretation must apply.
With these limitations, it seems unlikely that a state could prevent enforcement of an arbitration provision in a company's charter
or bylaws. Doing so would require a modification to its entire contract regime, which is more risky than it is worth.
2. The internal affairs doctrine's limits on state laws
Even if a state could craft a law to circumvent the FAA, it likely
would not matter. Sixty percent of corporations are incorporated in
Delaware, 230 and the internal affairs doctrine requires courts resolving disputes about the adoption or interpretation of charter and bylaw amendments to apply the law of the state of incorporation. 231
Thus, even if California modified its laws, Delaware law would likely
apply.
However, because the internal affairs doctrine is a state choice of
law provision, each state can choose whether to follow it. Most do,
but New York and California have carved out exceptions.
New York applies its own statutes to foreign corporations but
will not apply most of its provisions 232 to corporations that are listed

228. See supra note 227.
229. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
230. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 156, at 391, 395; see also Lewis, supra note 134.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302, cmt. a (1971). The restatement provides the following:
Matters falling within the scope of the rule of this Section [which defers to the state
of incorporation] and which involve primarily a corporation's relationship to its
shareholders include . . . the adoption of by-laws, . . . shareholders' rights to
examine corporate records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and the reclassification of shares.
ld.; see also id. at cmt. e (suggesting that whether an amendment was validly adopted is a question of Delaware law).
232. One provision that always applies is the right to bring a derivative suit. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW§ 1319(a) (McKinney 2011). However, any restrictions on arbitration of this suit are
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on a national securities exchange 233 or those that have less than half
of their income allocable to New York for state tax purposes. 234 Because targets of shareholder litigation are almost always listed on a
national exchange, New York law probably would not apply.
California is the state most likely to be hostile to an arbitration
provision in a charter or bylaw. The state usually applies the internal
affairs doctrine but occasionally limits it through cases or statutes.235 Like New York, California does not apply its own laws to
corporations listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ exchanges. 236 California also expressly defers to the state of incorporation for suits
against directors for breach of an official duty, which covers nearly
all shareholder litigation. 237
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that applying another
state's law to the internal affairs of Delaware corporations violates
the federal constitution's due process clause and dormant commerce
clause. 238 California, of course, disagrees, 239 so the internal affairs
doctrine is not the most reliable limitation.
C. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Response and the Applicability of Traditional

Defenses in Contract and Equity
The plaintiffs' bar is the most likely to fight fiercely against arbitration. Plaintiffs' attorneys will likely find a client to bring a suit to
block enforcement. This section analyzes various contract defenses
that may be argued. 240
likely preempted by the FAA.
233. See id. § 1320(a) (1).
234. See id. § 1320(a).
235. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 239 (West 2012).
236. Seeid. § 2115(c).
237. See id. § 2116. But see supra Part II.B. I.
238. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del.
2005). Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) (including the full faith and
credit clause as well). But see Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical justifications and Tentative
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1490-96 (2002) (criticizing this
position).
239. See Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558, 568-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see
also Valtz v. Penta lnv. Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Lewis, supra note
134.
240. Because defenses differ from state to state, this section focuses on those defenses
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As stated above, the FAA preempts any defense that is not "generally applicable," 241 meaning it cannot "rely on the uniqueness of
an agreement to arbitrate" as the basis for finding a contract unenforceable.242 Defenses cannot discriminate against arbitration directly or "disproportionate[ly] impact" arbitration. 243 Under this doctrine, only defenses focused on how a provision was adopted and
whom it binds will survive.
There are also three practical barriers when enforcing state law defenses to prevent arbitration. The simplest is that the party challenging
arbitration bears the burden of showing that the defense applies. 244
More formidable is the strong policy favoring arbitration. 245
Once a court finds an agreement to arbitrate, 246 that agreement

found in the Restatement or in Delaware law, which likely applies under the internal affairs doctrine.
241. Lewis, supra note 134.
242. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (quoting Perryv. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483,493 n.9 (1987)).
243. Id. (criticizing procedures that apply to both arbitration and litigation yet have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements).
244. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,483 (1989).
245. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983); see also
Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 ("Section 2, therefore, embodies a clear federal policy of requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or
is revocable 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."').
But see Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that there is no policy favoring arbitration, just a policy of favoring the enforcement of contracts); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY IN ARBITRATION jURISPRUDENCE:
How THE SUPREME COURT FLAUNTS AND FLUNKS CONTRACTS 5 (Paul D. Butler & Scott B. Pagel
eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1809005 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
policy favoring arbitration removes it from true contract law principles).
246. Courts have not always applied this preference at the same analytical stage. Some
courts apply the policy preference only to defenses. See, e.g., Am. United Logistics, Inc. v.
Catellus Dev. Corp., 319 F.3d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 2003); AGCO Corp. v. Anglin, 216 F.3d 589,
593-94 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[S]uch agreements must not be so broadly construed as to encompass
claims that were not intended to be arbitrated under the original contract."); Kalmar Indus. USA
LLC v. lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local838, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162-63 (D. Kan. 2006).
Other courts apply the preference once an agreement to arbitrate has been found. See Janiga v.
Questar Capital Corp. 615 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Any 'preference' for arbitration is
reserved for the interpretation of the scope of a valid arbitration clause . . . .");see also Bd. of
Trs. of Delray Beach Police & Firefighters Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 622 F.3d
1335,1342 (11thCir. 2010).
Other courts have applied the preference for arbitration throughout, including to determine if there was an agreement to arbitrate. See Howard Elec. & Mech. Co. v. Frank Briscoe
Co., 754 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying preference to the question of "whether an arbi-
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must be "rigorously enforce[d]," 247 and "any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."248 This strong policy favoring arbitration will make it difficult for any defense to succeed.
In addition, defenses are divided into two types: those that challenge the arbitration provision and those that challenge or would invalidate the entire contract. Defenses challenging only the arbitration
provision may be disputed in court, but defenses that would invalidate the entire contract are decided by the arbitrator, whose livelihood depends on the use of arbitration. 249 You can guess how that is
likely to turn out. The arbitrator's decision as to whether the defense
applies is subject to the same high standard required to overturn any
arbitral award-namely, manifest disregard of the law. 250
While most potential claims will likely fall to these general barriers, specific claims, such as those for fraud or unconscionability, will
face additional challenges.
1. Fraud

Fraud can be a contract defense, but there is nothing inherently
fraudulent about an arbitration provision, especially if shareholders

tration agreement exists and should be enforced," although the question in that case was whether a clause was a condition precedent to arbitration); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (stating that the parties' intentions should be
"generously construed as to issues of arbitrability," but focusing on the scope of the arbitration
agreement, not its existence); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1083-84
(Ala. 2005) (construing the parties' intentions '"generously'" in favor of arbitration).
The most sensible approach is to apply the preference only after the court finds an
agreement to arbitrate because "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). "[T]he basic objective in
this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties'
wishes, bur to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, 'are enforced
according to their terms,' and according to the intentions of the parties." First Options of Chi.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (citations omitted).
247. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985)).
248. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
249. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006).
250. See 9 USC. §§ 10, 11 (2006); see also Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 552
u.s. 576, 584-86 (2008).
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approve of it. The federal securities laws require corporations to include the charter and bylaws in every major filing with the SEC,
which, for reporting companies, would provide constructive notice of
the provision to shareholders several times a year. 251
2. Overwhelming bargaining power and unconscionability

If the company's directors unilaterally include an arbitration bylaw provision, shareholder plaintiffs may argue that the directors
have exercised undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power.252 Because few stockholders have the power to influence the affairs of the corporation, the purchase of stock is an adhesion contract
with negligible control over corporate affairs.
However, where a deep and liquid market exists, the arbitration
provision will be reflected in the share price. 253 Any bargaining power the directors might exercise over the shareholders is paid for by a
reduction (or increase) in the share price. 254 The market's ability to
push back against any harmful action refutes the claim that the directors have overwhelming power over shareholders. As long as an
investor has thousands of other stocks competing for her investment, the directors can claim no market power over the investor.
Even assuming the corporation had superior bargaining power,
"[s]uperior bargaining power alone without the element of unreasonableness does not permit a finding of unconscionability or unfairness."255 Delaware courts find "unconscionability or unfairness"
only where "no man in his senses and not under delusion would
[agree to it] on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept [the agreement], on the other." 256

251. See SEC Regulation 5-K, Item 601, table (requiring the charter and bylaws to be included as exhibits to forms S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, 10, 8-K, 10-D, 10-Q, and 10-K).
252. The courts refer to both "overweening bargaining power" and "overwhelming bargaining power," which I treat as synonymous. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
253. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
254. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (holding that a forum selection clause in a cruise ticket was reflected in the price of the ticket).
255. Tulowitzki v. Atl. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978).
256. Td. (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Arbitrating shareholder disputes benefits shareholders by reducing the incentives for strike suits, which provide no benefit, and by
bringing quicker enforcement in meritorious suits. The plaintiffs' bar
dislikes arbitration for the same reason it should be valued by shareholders-it gives quick, predictable results. 257 Because of arbitration's benefits, it is unlikely that a court will find an arbitration provision unconscionable.
3. Enforcement violates public policy
Under Delaware common law, "contracts that offend public policy or harm the public are deemed void." 258 Any public policy argument against arbitration will certainly fail given the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration. 259
Plaintiffs might point to two public policies that an arbitration
provision would offend. First, the federal and state securities laws
demonstrate a strong public policy favoring shareholder protection.
This argument will fail because the Supreme Court has already upheld arbitration agreements against the shareholder protection policies of the Securities Act of 1933 260 and the Exchange Act. 261
Second, plaintiffs might argue that arbitration provisions violate
a public policy favoring class action litigation for small, similar
claims. Whatever remains of this policy has been significantly narrowed by the Supreme Court's ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which upheld arbitration of identical claims of $30.22 brought
by thousands of litigants. 262
257. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 202-03 (discussing attempts by plaintiffs to increase unpredictability); Mirvis, supra note 134, at 18; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 280 (1995) ("The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster
than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the parties; it is often
more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices.")
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at l3 (1982)).
258. Lincoln Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A. 3d 436, 441 (Del.
2011) (emphasis omitted).
259. "[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) (quoted in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989)).
260. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478-79.
261. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,238 (1987).
262. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744-45, 1753 (2011).
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4. Retroactive application
A bylaw or charter provision probably cannot require arbitration
of disputes regarding acts that occurred before the provision was approved.
In Galaviz v. Berg, the District Court for the Northern District of
California rejected retroactive application of a forum selection clause
included in a corporation's bylaws. 263 Shareholders derivatively sued
the directors of Oracle, a Delaware corporation, for defrauding the
federal government. 264 Eight years after the fraud began, but before
the actions were filed, Oracle's board adopted a bylaw provision that
named the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for
any derivative action. 265
The court rejected the retroactive application of the bylaw because "the venue provision was unilaterally adopted by the directors
who [were] defendants in this action, after the majority of the purported wrongdoing [was] alleged to have occurred, and without the
consent of existing shareholders who acquired their shares when no
such bylaw was in effect." 266
The same result would likely be reached under Delaware law.
The Galaviz court did not perform a choice of law analysis, never discussed the internal affairs doctrine, and never said which state's law
applied, 267 but in Salaman v. National Media Corp., a Delaware court
held that a bylaw amendment could not modify a director indemnity
provision after the director had already been sued. 268 A company
probably could not enforce an arbitration provision that tried to retroactively apply to prior bad acts.

263. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
264. I d. at 1171 ~72.
265. Id.; see also In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959~61 (Del. Ch. 2010).
266. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
267. !d. at 1174 ("Oracle has not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a
venue provision that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to existing contract
terms.").
268. Salaman v. Nat'! Media Corp., No. 92C-01-161, 1992 WL 808095, at *6 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 8, 1992).
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5. Vested rights
Shareholders who purchase their shares after the arbitration provision is adopted will have a difficult time arguing that they should
not be bound by it. But shareholders that purchase before the arbitration provision is adopted may argue they have a vested interest in
the continued availability of the courts.
This argument will fail because shareholders have no vested
rights to any bylaw provision if the directors are authorized to unilaterally amend them. 269

6. Detrimental reliance
Shareholders that purchase before the adoption of an arbitration
provision may argue that they detrimentally relied on the availability
of the courts when purchasing the stock. Detrimental reliance is an
element of a claim for equitable estoppel, which arises when "a party, by his conduct or words, intentionally or unintentionally leads
another, in reliance on such words or conduct, to change his position
to his detriment." 270 This reliance must be reasonable, and Delaware
has held that if a corporation allows unilateral bylaw amendments by
the board, a party cannot reasonably rely on the bylaws remaining
constant. 271
7. Duty ofgood faith and fair dealing and fiduciary duties

If the arbitration provision is adopted unilaterally by the board or
by a ma!ority of shareholders over the objections of minority shareholders, 72 plaintiffs may argue that the amendment violates the du-

269. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (" [T]he only vested right
left is that specified in 8 Del. C. § 394, which prohibits a statutory charter amendment from taking away or impairing any remedy against any corporation or its officers for any liability which
shall have been previously incurred." (alterations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
270. See Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,697 (Del. Ch. 1983).
271. Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 493 n.7 ("TLC By-law Section 7.8 undercuts SoftKey's contention
that its rights vested because it detrimentally 'relied' on the then-existing by-law. Clearly any
such reliance by SoftKey was not justifiable, since SoftKey was on notice that the by-law was
subject to amendment by the TLC board.").
272. Majority shareholders sometimes owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. See
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ty of good faith and fair dealing. Every party to a contract has a duty
of good faith and fair dealing, which includes how a party exercises
its power to amend the terms. 273
In evaluating bylaws, Delaware largely defers to the board's
judgment. 274 Delaware courts presume bylaws are valid and reject
them only if they are "clearl~ adopted for an inequitable purpose and
have an inequitable effect." 2 5
It is unlikely that a court would find an arbitration bylaw
amendment to have an inequitable purpose or effect. As discussed
above, arbitration agreements are just a specialized type of forum selection clause, 276 and the Delaware Chancery Court has suggested
that corporations can include forum selection clauses in their governance documents. 277 So a court applying Delaware law would likely reject this defense.
This defense is also preempted by the FAA because it "rel[ies]
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate" as the basis for finding the provision unenforceable. 278 Phrased another way, every bylaw or charter provision changes some aspect of the corporation. If
the only reason that this change is objectionable is because it requires arbitration, then the defense cannot apply.

8. Gravely difficult and inconvenient forum
Arbitration clauses are a "specialized kind of forum-selection
clause." 279 Forum selection clauses are unenforceable if the forum is

Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. I 994). This duty is never greater
than the duty owed by directors, and I find that the directors' duty is not breached, so I do not
analyze the duty of majority shareholders separately.
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 cmt. e (1981); see also AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (upholding an arbitration agreement in a contract that "authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration
provision on several occasions").
274. Hollinger lnr'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Badie v.
Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that it would violate the
duty of good faith and fair dealing to insert an arbitration agreement into a contract, even where
the contract granted power to modifY or amend the contract unilaterally).
275. Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1080.
276. See supra note 161.
277. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 2010).
278. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (2011) (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9
(1987)).
279. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477,482-83 (1989) (quoting
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"so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [a plaintiff] will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court." 280 Arbitration in
Delaware or New York is unlikely to be considered gravely difficult
or inconvenient. The difficulty of getting to these corporate hubs is
likely overwhelmed by the "strong presumption in favor of enforcement [of forum selection clauses] . . . reinforced b~ the emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution." 2 1
V.

CONCLUSION

The inefficiencies of shareholder litigation impose tremendous
costs on shareholders. Arbitration can reduce the costs of strike suits
and can more rapidly resolve meritorious suits. By allowing corporations the freedom to innovate, we would leverage the full creativity
of the shareholders and boards to balance enforcement.
This can be accomplished through an amendment to either the
charter or bylaws, which will likely be considered a contract that
binds shareholders. Courts applying the Federal Arbitration Act will
likely enforce the provision, and it is unlikely that any defense will
apply. The only obstacle is the SEC's position that arbitration violates the Exchange Act. The SEC must bring its statutory interpretation in line with current Supreme Court precedent to allow companies the full benefits of customized enforcement.

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
280. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 18 (1972).
281. Mitsubishi, 4 73 U.S. at 631.
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